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Abstrak 
 
Bantuan Luar Negeri Untuk Pembangunan, atau lebih dikenal dengan nama ODA (Overseas Development Assistance), 
merupakan salah satu tiang penyangga terpenting dari kebijakan luar negeri Jepang. Melalui bantuan yang 
diberikannya, Jepang tidak saja mendapat keuntungan secara politik, ekonomi, militer dan budaya, tapi juga mampu 
mempertahankan laju dan kestabilan ekonominya.  Oleh karena itu, maka kebijakan untuk terus menyalurkan bantuan 
luar negerinya ke negara-negara dunia ketiga akan tetap dipertahankan Jepang.  
 
  
Abstract 
 
This Paper examines at a general level the utility of Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) program, where 
it is dispatched to, and its consequences to the recipient countries. In this paper special attention is  given to Japanese 
ODA to Indonesia.  In this paper I argue that the Japanese government has pursued, and still does pursue, aid relations 
with its neighbour seeking foremost political and economic benefit for Japan. Benefits for other are a secondary 
concern.  
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1. Introduction 
 
International aid is controversial. One prickly issue 
concerns the primary motivations of the donor nations. 
There is surely a composite of reasons that explain why 
national governments spend money from the public 
purse to assist poor countries. One reason is 
humanitarian—compassionate concern for humankind 
bestows a moral obligation on wealthy nations to help 
alleviate poverty elsewhere in the world (McNeill 1981; 
Abbot 1973; Nester 1992). Governments of donor 
nations usually include this justification in policy 
statements that explain their aid strategies. A typical 
explanatory note to Japan’s aid program put it this way: 
 
“Japan is fully committed to its role in fulfilling the 
responsibility of the international community that the 
more advanced countries assist the developing 
countries, and has been making every effort to increase 
its economic assistance to contribute to the solution of 
the North-South problem. As a country that is 
committed to peace and as the second largest free-
market economy in the world, Japan intends to 
contribute to the maintenance and promotion of 
international peace and security through economic 
assistance to the developing countries” (Guide to 
Japan's Aid, 1990: 4).  
 
It is clear from this statement that this assistance is to be 
given by `Japan’ such that  the assistance actually 
reaches the people who need it most, if that is the true 
intention. Other explanations paint a less altruistic 
position on the part of donor nations. These include 
some critiques that paint international aid as exploitative 
and at its worst, a tool of imperialism. Hasegawa 
(1975), Nester (1992) and Carnoy (1974) are among 
those who have argued that real donor motives are more 
often covert than overt and more often self-interested 
than altruistic. It is, of course, naïve to think that nations 
are exclusively motivated by altruistic desire to help the 
poor. Yet these authors argue that far more of 
government concerns for national self-interest than 
official aid policy rhetoric ever indicates. 
 
The reason for this is straightforward. Aid is not given 
and received in a political vacuum. Bilateral aid in 
particular, by its very nature, involves dialogue between 
representatives of two sovereign governments which 
operate within political and diplomatic constrains 
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(Abbott, 1973: 1-10). Aid is only one instrument of 
foreign policy but it is considered as an integral element 
for maintaining cordial relations with countries that are 
regarded as having strategic and commercial 
importance. A 1972 Ministry of Foreign Affairs report 
states that `Tokyo should give aid to assist foreign 
development, not simply to reinforce Japan’s double-
digit growth rates’. My brief analysis of Japan’s aid 
program later, provides evidence that despite the 
defensive verbiage, national self-interest mostly around 
economic rewards has continued to shape Japan’s ODA 
policy. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
In order to examine the aid relations between national 
societies, especially between developed and developing 
country, this study employs an analytical framework 
built upon theories of imperialism. Here, imperialism is 
taken to refer to the  relation between the 'core' 
countries of developed industrial North and the 
'periphery' countries of the South. According to this 
model, the periphery countries do not have ability to 
control their economic (and even, arguably, their 
political) development as they want to. The core 
countries will decide and determine how far and what 
kind of development will suitable for them. As pointed 
out by Lichtheim "What counts is the relationship of 
domination and subjection"(Lichtheim, 1971: 9). I 
believe that in analyzing the way advanced 
industrialized countries carry out their policies of aid 
relations toward developing countries through the model 
of imperialistic relations with an imperialistic theory of 
development (represented by dependency theory) is 
more suitable  for understanding international relations 
than using a model derived from   theories of 
development (e.g. as represented by modernization 
theory) which pretends to expand the notions of 
improving social welfare of underdeveloped and 
developing countries. Although both refer to capitalism, 
the discursive point of view of the subjects are different. 
Imperialistic understandings accommodates the view of 
those who are exploited, while capitalistic 
understandings focuses on the generosity of the donors 
and the stronger countries.  
 
A philosophy espousing enlightened self-interest has 
been put forward by donor nations to legitimise their 
use of foreign aid for self-serving ends as well as to 
assist the nations that are supposed to receive the aid. 
This rationale gained some credence as evidence 
continued to mount that foreign aid projects do not 
perform the economic and social miracles that were 
once expected of them. But it is not just that donors can 
be major beneficiaries of their own aid. Another 
problem concerns governments as the administrative or 
distributing bodies. Sometimes when aid is channelled 
through powerful elites it does not read the powerless in 
the receiving nation who most need it (see e.g. Bauer 
and Yamei, 1972: 41ff.). 
 
An extension of this line of argument sees aid as a 
covert form of neo-imperialism that preserves the 
structure of dependence and subordination in the 
interests of Western capital. This view finds the use of 
aid by Western nations a means to promote or maintain 
the capitalist system in the Third World, and to extend 
the social, economic and political hegemony of the 
powerful Western hegemons in those areas. The power 
behind the capitalist system today is often multinational, 
or more accurately `transnational’ corporations that own 
or control production or service facilities outside the 
country in which they are based. 
 
Sometimes aid has been given to foster shared 
ideological disposition, as `strategic aid’ under Cold war 
conditions demonstrates clearly. Here aid becomes a 
tool to align the values, interests and world views of 
recipient governments with those of the donor 
government. Aid has also been used to sustain the 
influence of colonising nations in ex-colonies, as with 
UK and France postwar, or building new spheres of 
influence as the United States has done postwar. Some 
donor nations have used aid to secure benefits for their 
industries at home which are contracted to provide 
expertise and technology required for aid delivery. In 
the 1980s as much as 70 percent of British aid had a 
direct commercial benefit to private corporations in 
Britain itself (Webster 1990). 
 
Aid can also increase opportunities for the donor to 
expand export markets. The trade motive behind aid is 
amply evident in `trade aid` packages that facilitate 
commercial exports and private investment 
opportunities for the donor as well as the recipient. Most  
donor countries have institutional framework for this 
process, such as the United States Export-Import Bank 
and Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Japan has 
the Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank) and the Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). Britain has Aid 
and Trade Provisions. Multilateral institutions such as 
the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and 
United Nations agencies also facilitate this `trade aid` 
process (Carnoy 1974; Rix 1980; Hayter 1989, Webster 
1990). The main beneficiaries of this form of aid are 
those countries which provide the bulk of international 
expertise to developing countries and which export 
equipment through direct links with aid agencies and 
projects. 
 
Aid can also be used for explicitly ideological ends--to 
build up social and political systems that are considered 
to be consistent with donors’ political disposition. By 
attaching specific conditions to aid, donors can secure 
the smoother functioning of the aid system and ensure 
that the returns they seek for themselves are put in 
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place, e.g. contractors from the donor nation are used in 
aid delivery, the receiving nations’ restrictions on 
donors’ imports are removed. Aid may also be used to 
create and sustain, within the government of the Third 
World countries, a class that is dependent on the 
continued existence of aid and foreign private 
investment. This type of aid reinforces unequal power 
structures in Third World countries and thus functions 
to help preserve of the capitalist system (Abbott, 1973; 
Hayter, 1989). 
 
3. Analysis and Data Interpretations 
 
3.1 An Overview of Japanese ODA 
 
The motives behind the Japanese aid program are not 
dramatically less pure than those driving other donor 
nations’ aid programs. They involve a mix of national 
economic and strategic imperatives as well as 
humanitarian concerns for receivers. (Nester 1992; 
Yanagihara and Emig 1991; Rix 1990). Hasegawa 
Sukehiro in his 1975 study of Japanese foreign aid 
identified at least five objectives driving Japan’s aid 
policy: (1) to spur the process of Japanese 
reconstruction and economic growth; (2) to establish 
diplomatic relations between Japan and neighboring 
countries; (3) to maintain political, economic, and social 
systems, and stabilise policies that are beneficial to 
Japan in countries that receive Japanese aid; (4) to raise 
per capita income in Japan through the commercial flow 
back to Japan from foreign aid projects; and (5) to assert 
Japan’s influence and leadership in both regional and 
global communities (Hasegawa, 1975: 11). These five 
goals may be achieved through the conduct of Japan’s 
overall ODA program. 
 
The Japanese government began its overseas aid 
program after the end of World War II in the form of 
reparations payments to countries that had suffered 
Japanese military occupation during the war. Japan 
qualified as an official aid donor when it joined the 
Colombo Plan in 1954. At that time Japan provided aid 
on a small scale, mainly in the form of technical 
assistance (Loutfi, 1973: 47). The thrust of Japanese 
ODA in its early years was mainly self-serving export 
promotion and natural resources procurement though 
tied-aid projects in Asian countries. (Hanabusa 1991; 
Yanagihara and Emig 1991; Rix 1980, 1987, 1990; 
Inada 1990). In the late 1960s and 1970s, the structure 
and geographic target of Japanese ODA changed. Yet 
Asia remained as the top priority region among Japan’s 
ODA recipients worldwide, while more nations from 
Africa, Latin America, Middle East and Oceania 
became recognised by Japan as eligible to receive 
Japanese ODA.  
 
The total yen value of Japan’s aid program has 
increased considerably since that time and the range of 
programs on offer has been expanded. The programs 
include yen loans, technical, economic and other grants, 
contributions through multilateral institutions, in 
particular the World Bank and the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), and through regional 
financial institutions such as the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). 
 
In 1984, Japan surpassed France to become the second 
largest donor nation. In fiscal 1987 to 1988, Japan 
leaped ahead again, surpassing the US to take position 
as the world’s `number one’ aid donor. (Yanagihara and 
Emig, 1991: 37).  
 
3.2  Institutionalisation 
 
A landmark for Japan as a donor nation came in 1960 
when Japan became a member of the Development 
Assistance Group, the international body of aid-donor 
nations within the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) that later 
became the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 
(Brooks and Orr, Jr., 1985: 325). In the early years of 
Japan’s aid program, the principal agency for 
administering aid loans was a single body, the Japan 
Export-import Bank. The OECF was established in 
1961 as a semi-official lending institution under the 
Finance Ministry’s Economic Planning Agency. In its 
early days, the OECF functioned as a weak junior 
partner to the Bank, and over time gradually assumed 
control of much of the official aid programs (Caldwell 
1972). The government set guidelines to demarcate 
responsibilities between them in 1975, making the 
OECF responsible for implementing all loans with a 
grant element of 25 percent or above (Yanagihara, 
1991: 39). 
 
In 1962, an institution to administer technical 
assistance, the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency 
(OTCA), was established under the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. A variety of programs were incorporated under 
the ambit of technical assistance, including technical 
training for foreign officials. In 1974, the functions of 
OTCA were extended and the body was transformed 
into the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA). JICA has since remained the main agency for 
implementing technical assistance programs, thus 
managing a large part of Japan’s grant aid (Yanagihara, 
ibid., see also Rix 1980). 
 
3.3 ODA and Japan’s Changing  
 
International Status 
From the 1970s, Japan began to shape up as a 
formidable economic power in the world order. Japan 
emerged as the world’s second largest economy, it 
became the world’s third largest trading nation and 
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largest capital exporter, certainly a major economic 
player globally. The swift rise of Japan as an economic 
power has forced other countries to adjust. This process 
has helped to cast a spotlight on Japan’s financial and 
political relations with other nations. Japan attracts 
concern and interest, criticism and praise, suspicion and 
expectation, tempered with the historical and economic 
caution. The Japanese government meantime struggles 
to establish a more influential position for Japan in the 
world community, a position that the government 
justifies as both appropriate and expected by other 
nations, given Japan’s status as an economic and non-
military power (Yanagihara and Emig, 1991: 39-40).  
 
Japan’s international status as a global economic power 
and the largest donor of aid internationally is far from 
the position Japan held at the end of World War II in 
1945. After the War, Japan was one of the largest aid 
recipients. Japan continued to receive aid for at least a 
decade after the War and made its last payment on aid 
loans in 1983. Clearly Japan has completely 
transformed its position in the business of international 
aid. 
 
In the second half of the 1970s, the Japanese 
government launched a series of mid-term plans to 
guide the expansion of its ODA program. The plan 
consisted of four major aid initiatives known as `double 
target’ plans that aimed to double the amount of annual 
aid in each plan from the baseline of the previous plan. 
Japan’s four aid redoubling plans extended its foreign 
aid package dramatically. The strong value of the yen 
toward the US dollar helped Tokyo to surpass the US as 
the largest source of aid globally.  
 
3.4 Japan’s ODA to Indonesia 
 
Historically, among other Asian countries Indonesia has 
proved particularly attractive to Japan through its rich 
natural resources and geopolitically important location 
even before the Pacific War. Japan’s southward advance 
in the late 1930s was motivated by Indonesia’s oil.  As 
Masashi Nishihara noted in commenting on Japan’s 
policies toward Southeast Asia, ‘It is suggested that 
Japan’s policies in Southeast Asia evolved first from its 
interests in Indonesia’s natural resources, potential 
export market, and geopolitical location’ (Nishihara, 
1976: 9).  
 
In the postwar period, the Japanese continued this 
interest in Indonesia’s natural resources and geopolitical 
location. Just a year after Indonesia’s abortive coup of 
1965, Japan then initiated the establishment of the Inter-
Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) in 1966, this 
organization is now known as Consultative Group on 
Indonesia (CGI). At the same time, in April, Japan also 
sponsored the Southeast Asian Ministerial Conference 
on Economic Development (Nishihara, 1976: 203-204). 
Therefore, in principle, it could be said that Indonesia 
became the most important nation for Japan in the 
Southeast Asia region. Compared to other ASEAN 
countries, Indonesia is the biggest recipient of Japanese 
direct investment (Suzuki, 1990: 8). 
 
The reasons for Japan‘s ODA concentration in 
Indonesia is almost the same as those of Japan’s ODA 
concentration in Asia as a whole. From the point of 
view of rehabilitating bad image of Japan, Indonesia is 
among the countries that must first be considered. This 
is understandable since the country had ‘bitter 
experience’ with Japan prior to the end of World War II. 
Japan’s occupation in Indonesia, which lasted for three 
and half years, in fact, raised miseries almost relatively 
comparable to that raised by Dutch occupation for three 
hundred and fifty years. 
 
Indonesia has a special position which is very important 
for Japan. It is one of the largest suppliers of natural 
resources to Japan. With its great amount of natural 
resources, Japan in the long run cannot but rely on 
Indonesia as its major supplier. Thus maintaining a 
better image and relationship with this country  in a 
political imperative which in turn is hoped to guarantee  
a fluent supply of natural resources to Japan.  
 
Indonesia has other special importance for Japan in the 
sense of its potency as a field of Japanese economic 
activities. Its importance is not in the sense of traditional 
‘Imperialism’ either. In traditional term of market, 
Japan’s trade with Indonesia showed a deficit on 
Japan’s side. In 1989, the balance of Japan-Indonesia 
trade was US $ 7.7 billion where Japan’s export was US 
$ 3.3 billion compared to its import of US $ 11 billion 
(Schwarz and Vatikiotis, 1991: 95; Nester, 1992: 102). 
 
Apart as a ‘market’, Indonesia’s importance also lies in 
its position as the biggest concentration of Japanese 
investment. Japan’s investment in Indonesia holds the 
first rank among the foreign investors, with 24. 8 % of 
the share cumulatively grew between 1967-1990 
(Schwarz and Vatikiotis, 1991: 96). Large amounts of 
capital invested in Indonesia, willy nilly, obligate 
Japan’s government to provide protection to their 
investors in Indonesia. The type of protection needed by 
the Japanese investor is not in the sense of military one, 
but rather, as we have discussed earlier, in the form of 
good relations between investors’ home country and 
host countries. 
 
That Indonesia is one of the rich natural resources 
countries is a fact that Japan cannot neglect. Japan’s 
deficit balance of trade toward Indonesia, as shown 
above, is due to large amount of natural resources Japan 
must import from Indonesia. Again, security in the 
sense of a stable supply of natural resources is among 
the highest priorities which must be considered at the 
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outset before aid are flowed abroad. In spite of 
Indonesia as the largest recipient of all types of 
Japanese ODA, her position is not revealed as the 
largest recipient of Japanese grant aid.  
 
Among the ten major recipients of Japanese grant aid, 
Bangladesh has occupied a premier position during the 
year 1984 to 1989. After Bangladesh, the ranking of 
countries has shifted, with Thailand reaching the 
number two position from 1984 to 1987, and the same 
position was held by the Philippines in 1988 to 1989. 
Indonesia has occupied sixth rank in 1989, seventh rank 
in 1984, 85, 86 and 88, and eight rank  in 1987. 
 
Like in other recipient countries, the main focus of 
Japanese ODA in Indonesia is the provision of funding 
support for the establishment and expansion of basic 
infrastructure facilities, the so-called ‘hard’ type of 
assistance. In recent years, however, Japan’s ODA 
programs have begun to pay attention to Basic Human 
Needs (BHN) based projects, even though the share of 
ODA in education, health and social infrastructure and 
welfare, on a commitment basis was only about 12% in 
1986 (Pante, 1988: 32).  
 
In the case Indonesia, the projects supported by Japan’s 
aid program which are classified under ‘BHN’ do not 
always mean the ‘soft’ type of assistance, because in 
many cases the assistance comes in the form of 
buildings and the provision of equipments. Of course, 
there is nothing wrong with this situation, but what is 
important is the results of such generosity; what 
buildings are built? Where are they built, and what type 
of equipment are acquired? 
 
Moreover, although ODA (loan) have been provided at 
relatively low cost to 'third World borrowers’, there is 
now a very large debt-burden carried by most Third 
World economies. This debt-burden is a unique feature 
of the process of 'development' as experienced by the 
Third World.  And it is attended by hunger, sickness and 
poverty. Recently, while official and commercial banks 
have been prepared to lend increasing amounts to 
Indonesia (in fact almost two-thirds comes from private 
banks), the ability of this country to repay these loans 
looks increasingly unlikely. 
    
4. Conclusion  
 
Based on the findings of Japan’s aid flows abroad, 
especially to Indonesia, Japanese pragmatism is the 
operating principle, both at the diplomatic and strategic 
levels, rather than humanitarian considerations as her 
main motivational force in aid disbursement. Even at 
the project level, government to government 
negotiations and recipient priorities often dictate the 
type of project and hence the technology that will be  
 
transferred.   It follows, therefore, that on one hand, the 
choice of aid recipients, projects, and technology will be 
determined by economic and political interests within 
Japan, and on the other hand in the  recipient country, 
interests will be decided by powerful elite’s who share 
similar views, operate within the same capitalist system 
of production and distribution, and stand to gain from a 
definition of ‘development’ as an economic and growth 
related phenomena, according to the dictum of the 
donor. In short, the Japanese grant aid programs are too 
rigid and very are closely linked to the procurement of 
goods and services from Japan, i.e. buildings, 
equipment, supplies, Japanese experts, survey teams and 
so forth, to maintain its future political and economic 
interests.  
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